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The Assembly and Provisioning of a Red Team
Daryl G. Johnson
Networking, Security and Systems Administration Department
Rochester Institute of Technology
Rochester, NY USA

Abstract – As the value and merit of red team exercises in
both academic and corporate settings continues to grow,
the need to share experiences with staffing, organizing and
supporting the red team becomes increasingly important.
This paper documents the Northeast Collegiate Cyber
Defense Competition’s (NECCDC) Red Team captain’s
experiences and lessons learned over the past four years.
The paper will begin by identifying the skills and attributes
needed for a Red Team and a process for selecting and
recruiting members. The methods employed to form a
cohesive working group from the members in the time
available prior to the event will be discussed. The
resources necessary for the Red Team to be effective and
how they were provided is examined. We will look at how
to promote planning and organization within the team
focused on specific strategic goals and objectives of the
Red Team. There are several duties during the event for a
Red Team captain that will be examined and cautions that
will be explained. At the end of the competition, the style
and delivery of the after-action-report can have a profound
effect on the Blue Teams. Experience with different
approaches over the years will be examined.
Recommendations for Red Team/Blue Team exchanges that
can maximize the learning outcome for the students will be
provided. Finally this paper will provide a summary of the
experiences for others seeking to form and organize a Red
Team either for a competition or an internal educational
event.
Keywords: red team, security, education.
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Introduction
The threats to an organization’s information
infrastructure today have never been greater as
illustrated by the FBI/CSI Computer Crime Survey.
From the often quoted Sun Tzu we have “If you know
the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the
results of a hundred battles.”[1] Professor Pascale
Carayon describes Red Teaming as “an advanced
form of assessment that can be used to identify
weaknesses in the security of a variety of systems. The
red team approach is based on the premise that an
analyst who attempts to model an adversary can find
systemic vulnerabilities in a computer and information
system that would otherwise go undetected.”[2] As

the value and merit of Red Team exercises in both
academic and commercial settings continues to grow
the need to share experiences with staffing, organizing
and supporting the red team become vitally important.
This paper documents the Northeast Collegiate Cyber
Defense Competitions (NCCDC) Red Team captain’s
experiences over the past four years. The many issues
influencing the selection of skills and capabilities, the
organization and planning, and the execution of the
event from the Red Team perspective will be
examined.
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Assembling the Team
The selection of the individuals for any activity
requiring highly skilled members is critical to their
combined success.
Red Teams are especially
sensitive because of the high degree of specialized
skills and the pressure of the competition itself.
There are three characteristics that we looked for in
recruiting Red Team members. First, passion for the
security field is the best motivator when a difficult
situation or road block presents itself. It pushes the
individual to perform above and beyond their limits.
Second, skill, preparation and dependability: can they
do the job? Are they willing to work long hours for
no pay? Can they deliver what they promise? The best
indicator I have found is references, recommendations
and experience and I rely on all three routinely.
And third, do they exhibit the characteristics of
cooperation, camaraderie, and team focus? Are they
wild horses that cannot or will not pull together for the
team but run off by themselves? Do they see
themselves as part of something bigger, i.e. the team?
Can they see the goals of the team and work towards
them? As with the previous set of characteristics,
references, recommendations and experience are
important but here I call mainly upon the trusted
returning members.

2.1

Diversity of Skills
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Being an expert is important but having the right
mix of skills is critical.[4] Having the right blend of
talents and two-deep coverage on the team in vital
areas can make all of the difference for red team
success.
The skills necessary for a red team member cut
across many areas and are changing every year.
New languages, OS distros, applications, and
networking gear add to the challenge each year.
Some of the skills currently on the list are:
Windows, Linux and Cisco platforms, vulnerability.
Additionally,
exploit
development,
exploit
execution, persistence, stealthy techniques, web
application exploits, and social engineering are
valuable.

Whether you are going camping in the Rocky
Mountains or making dinner, you need certain
resources and equipment to be successful. A red team
has requirements as well that help ensure that they
accomplish their goals.

3.1

There are more mundane resources needed by the
red team.
Besides your basic pens, paper,
whiteboards, and markers, we have found several
other valuable resources. In short lived, fast paced
exercises, intra-team communication is crucial to
getting the most out of the team. A bag of USB
sticks helps quickly move data and tools around. A
networked printer in the red team room for
documentation and reports is useful. Keeping track
of who has what IP address within the red team,
what is known about the blue teams, who is focusing
on what aspect of which blue team, and a host of
other information can be facilitated by whiteboards,
poster boards on the walls and lots of duct tape
(lots). But this year, the best tools utilized by the
red team for organizing and keeping track of both
the blue and red teams was Armitage.[5] This GUI
interface for Metasploit with its team collaboration
support provided a great platform for intra-team
documentation and coordination of effort. Armitage
facilitated the coordination of members skilled at
target acquisition, exploitation, persistence and
score-able information harvesting.

Camaraderie
Not the most technical characteristic but amity and
solidarity are none the less very important to the red
team. The members of the team must not only
respect each other’s technical skills but appreciate
the opportunity to red team together. Disrespect or
even antagonism can severely impact the
performance of the team as a whole.
Since typically the Red Team comes from a wide
geographical area, they may not know each other
socially. The best indicator is how they worked as a
team member during the previous year’s exercises.
However, with new members that may not be
possible.
Soliciting feedback from established
members is critical. Some of the best indicators
come from Twitter and other social networking sites.
The tenor of their posts, how others respond, and
what other say about the candidates can reveal much
about their character and how they might work as a
team.

Resources Required
The most obvious requirement is a computer. The
workstation that the red team member works on is
their main tool and a very personal one. Typically
the red team members are required to prepare and
bring their own workstation including any and all
software they might require. Frequently they bring
more than one and sometimes a server or networking
gear as well.

In comparison, the blue team must consider in its
candidate selection and training the duplication of
skill sets across their membership. This goal is
primarily driven by the possibility that a member
might be lost due to illness or as part of the exercise.
Two-deep coverage on the red team is chiefly driven
by the benefits derived from the mutual support and
greater problem solving capabilities gained from “an
extra set of eyes” and “a different point of view” of
a difficulty. Therefore selecting at least two red
team members focused or at least proficient at every
skill area has proven itself a valuable goal.

2.2

Provisioning the Team

3.2

Support Structure
In addition to the resources mentioned, the 2011 red
team was supported by an individual on the red team
dedicated to system support. This was one of the
improvements requested by several of last year’s red
team. With the compressed time frame of the
exercise it was felt that an individual who could
maintain support services such as a red team web,
DNS, DHCP and other services as identified for the
rest of the red team would aid in keeping the red
team members focused on the attacks.

One of the time consuming and distracting tasks for
the red team was recording and submitting scoreable accomplishments. The system support
individual prepared and managed a system to make
it easier for the red team members to construct a
report of a new exploit or duplicate a similar
existing report and modify it. This system also
helped to sure that all required information and
evidence was included in the report to make sure
that it was grade-able by the white team.
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Team Planning
Six to nine months before the event, the recruiting of
red team members begins. It has to start this early to
get on peoples calendars before other commitments.
Even then their commitment can be superseded by
employer priorities or family demands (new additions
to a family do take priority). In four years of
planning, there has always been at least one member
whose plans get thwarted. Therefore, it is advisable to
recruit at least one extra member for the red team.
The security community is a relatively small and
remarkably close society. Coupled with the need for
camaraderie and that the group will be working very
closely and intensely for three long days, soliciting
suggestions from returning members for new recruits
is a big plus. They can also provide feedback on
potential new members. This activity solidifies the
members ownership of responsibility for the teams
overall success and provides the red team captain with
a much broader view of the perspective market place
for new members.

4.1

“…Know thyself”
As the membership in the red team is incrementally
established, team building activities can begin.
Several mechanisms for intra-team communication
have been tried: wikis, Google groups and docs, etc.
Everyone’s life is busy and you are asking these
folks to volunteer a nice chunk of their time (much
of it personal) with no remuneration other than some
fame and bragging rights. Communication has to be
easy. It has to be normal. None of the tools
mentioned was used by a large enough segment of
the team to become adopted. Plain old email has
year after year ended up being the communication
platform of choice that everyone could live with.
The first item of business is to introduce all of the
members to each other. The captain typically starts
with a short bio, background and skills. The rest of
the team follows with their contribution. The
captain should collect all of these as late joining
members will need to be brought up to speed.

The next phase is planning a strategy for the event.
The captain might start with some questions for the
team such as: Do we assign red team members to
each blue team or to each target type? Much of the
planning is only instigated by the red team captain.
Once started often the red team members direct the
planning themselves with minimal steerage from the
captain.

4.2

Clarifying the Goals of the Red Team
Red teaming is thrilling. The hunt and capture
aspect is exhilarating. One problem that has been
seen in previous red team exercises is the loss of
focus on what is the red team’s actual goal. That
question is often answered with “Well, breaking into
the blue teams systems of course!” The problem
with that answer is that it is neither accurate nor
realistic. An attacker in the wild would break into a
system but that would not be their goal. Their goal
is to secure a reward. That reward might come in
the form of compensation for items acquired after
breaking in such as credit card numbers, PII or trade
secrets. Their goal is something on the other side of
the door they forced open.
For the red team the goal is to score points. Those
points come can come from breaking in but it does
not stop there. Often the red team can become
focused on the exploit and lose sight of the more
realistic goal of obtaining database contents,
credentials, PII and confidential documents. The
exploit is professionally satisfying and therefore can
itself become the focus. The red team needs to be
encouraged to look beyond the exploit and focus on
scoring as many points as possible.
Part of the planning of the red team is answering the
question: “Now that we are in do we pillage or
burn?” There is a part of most folks that want to
“rm –rf /” when they get privileges. And although
that does score points because you could do it and
the blue team loses more points because they are
down and miss service checks, is it the best
approach if the goal of the red team is to score as
many points as possible? The red team has tossed
around this question many times and evolved an
heuristic approach to the issue which will
undoubtedly change again. Using the law of
diminishing returns, once the score-able points
gleaned from a system nears zero and no additional
avenues of attack present themselves, plant as many
backdoors as possible and bring the system down.
Nearing the end of a day when it is no longer
possible to recover, burn the system. The mental
and morale strike of having a system down over

night is a tough hit. At the beginning of the last day
wipe all systems possible so that recovery is futile.
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knowledge the red team must rely on guesses and
assumptions.
One of the duties that keep the red team captain
constantly busy throughout the event is taking
questions from the red team to the white team for
clarification and ruling. Is it allowed to do ...? Can
we get points for …? Does this rule mean …? About
a third of the red team captain’s time during the event
is spent resolving red team questions.

Challenges Faced
Probably the greatest challenge to the red team is
time. Realistically an attacker would be able to
perform reconnaissance stealthily over a long period.
The time compression of the event makes stealth
difficult. It also makes recovery of lost persistence
within the blue team costly in terms of points scored.
The best defense against time for the red team is
planning and preparation.

5.1

The Unknown
Time is not the only challenge to the red team.
Typically few facts are known about the target
infrastructure and nothing is known about the
business injects that will be employed.
The
inclusion of injects that involve forensics on boxes,
VoIP, SCADA, non-typical network devices or OSs,
or other unusual services become difficult to exploit
without time to overcome the often steep learning
curve.
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Another third of the red team captain’s time is spent
answering questions from the white team. Explaining
what a scoring reports means is frequent but other
white team questions come up as well. Is this alarmed
event because of a red team action? Did the red team
do …? Did you folks brick …? We are seeing … - is
that you folks?

6.1

The red team captain is typically going to be as
much of a “techie” as the rest of the red team
members. The attraction to “join in the fun” and
perform exploits and dig for score-able things is
magnetic. My experience is that when the red
team’s captain “plays” the duties that fall solely on
the red team captain’s shoulders do not get the
attention necessary and both the red team and the
competition can suffer. The caution is “even if you
think you can wear two hats at once, your head is
not really that big!” If you accept the role of red
team captain, also accept that you will not be
performing exploits.

Duties of the Red Team Captain
Besides the recruiting, organizing, and provisioning
responsibilities already mentioned, the red team
captain works with the white team before the event to
develop a working relationship and provide input on
competition development.
It is helpful to red team morale if they can all stay at
the same hotel. The red team often worked late into
the night on exploit development and planning. Last
year we were able to procure a meeting room at the
hotel for part of the time to facilitate this after hours
work.
Even with the scoring system, the red team captain
must read and validate all of the scoring reports before
they are forwarded to the white team. Last year we
thought that the new red team scoring system would
eliminate the captain validation step but it did not and
likely cannot. Mistakes will be made and issues of
misunderstanding of score-able events and reporting
consistency between members of the red team will
continue to require the captain’s scrutiny.
Relative to scoring, the red team captain should work
with the white team to clarify how the scoring will
work. The red team members need to know what are
considered score-able items or activities. The scoring
function should emulate the relative value of various
assets and difficulty of acquiring them. Without this

Cautions for the Red Team Captain
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After Action Report
Besides the competition aspect, the CCDC events are
a powerful and unique learning experience for the
students. Attending blue teams come with all levels of
preparation and skill. Part of the value of the red team
is to give the blue teams both encouragement to
continue in the security field and comeback next year
as well as feedback on what they did well and how
they can improve in the future.
Traditionally the red team has conducted an after
action debriefing to all of the blue teams at once at the
end of the event.
The report has been part
introduction to the red team members and a general
overview of what the red team has accomplished and
observed. The problem was that the presentation was
limited in time and could only be very general. Also
new teams can get overwhelmed and possibly
discouraged because of inadequate preparation and
experience. These teams need encouragement and
support to not give up.

Last year at the 2011 NECCDC, we tried something
different with two teams that struggled during the
competition. Their coaches asked us to stop in and
talk to them giving some pointers and specific
feedback. We then conducted our typical all team
debriefing. Our experience with the two teams
meeting with them individually was an epiphany. The
change in their attitude and morale was striking. We
spent 15 minutes with each of the two teams. We
were able to provide specific feedback about their
team. We also answered lots of their specific
questions about what we did and what they could do
to better prepare. At the end there was no question
that they had benefitted from the competition and
were coming back next year.
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Conclusions
Our experience with assigning red team members to
skill and application specific areas, instead of to a
blue team, has served us well. It made the most
effective use of our skills and attention.
It is imperative that the red team through the red team
captain be involved with the white team before the
event, consulting on the design and development of
the exercise. A blind red team mainly tests the red
team’s skills not the blue team’s skills and
preparation.[6]
Our experience with the one-on-one debriefings with
the blue teams has convinced us of their value to the
students. We are recommending next year that time
be allocated after the event to allow the red team to
meet individually for 15 minutes with each of the blue
teams. It is our experience that this provides better
feedback and more values to the students.
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